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in the oil and gas sector in Guatemala. The case study emphasizes the need
for additional environmental reform at IFC. With two separate loans in 1994
and 1996, IFC supported the activities of a small international oil company
that was operating within a national park in the northern Guatemalan
Petdn, an area of rich tropical forests and globally important wetlands. The
company's operations had been "grandfathered" into the park upon its crea-
tion in 1990. Funding from IFC was used to construct a pipeline from the oil
field in the park to a refinery outside of the park. The crux of the authors'
findings is that the pipeline should have been constructed to follow the path of
an existing road, rather than along the chosen route that crosses significant
stretches of primary tropical forest and that opened a new right-of-way into a
park already facing continued pressure from colonization. The authors con-
clude that a stronger set of IFC lending policies, combined with a better envi-
ronmental impact assessment and more extensive public consultation, would
have led to a less environmentally damaging outcome. Although the authors
acknowledge the complex questions about the role of governments, develop-
ment agencies, the private sector, conservation organizations, and local com-
munities raised by this issue, they focus on the narrow subject of IFC's role
in this matter, stressing the need for a reform agenda at that institution.
I. INTRODUCTION
The lending practices of the World Bank' have been subject to scru-
tiny and criticism by environmentalists and governments for nearly two
decades. In particular, numerous investments in large-scale dams and
other infrastructure development projects have been shown to have high
environmental costs and questionable development benefits. 2 In response
to these criticisms, the World Bank created a series of policy measures
designed to reduce the environmental impacts of its lending. The most
significant reforms so far have occurred at the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development (IBRD) and International Development As-
sociation (IDA), the two main public finance arms of the World Bank.
However, at the same time that World Bank public sector lending reforms
have started to take hold, private capital flows have increased dramati-
cally in recent years.3 As a result, environmentalists have increased their
scrutiny of the loans and lending practices of the International Finance
Corporation (IFC), the private sector lending arm of the World Bank. This
Article presents a case study of IFC lending in the oil and gas sector in
Guatemala that underscores the need for additional environmental reform
at IFC.
This case study involves IFC, a small international oil company called
Basic Resources International Limited (Company), and Conservation In-
1 The World Bank Group includes the International Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the Multilateral Invest-
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC).
2 See BRUCE RICH, MORTGAGING THE EARTH: THE WORLD BANK, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPOVER-
ISHMENT, AND THE CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT (1994) for a discussion of such projects as the
Polonoroeste regional development program, Balbina Dam, and others.
3 THE WORLD BANK, 1996 ANNUAL REPORT 61 (1997).
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ternational (CI), a Washington-based conservation nongovernmental or-
ganization (NGO) with offices and a substantial field presence in
Guatemala. We begin with a section containing background information
on conservation measures undertaken in the northern Pet~n region of
Guatemala, a brief history of oil development in that region prior to 1994,
and an overview of current oil operations in the area. We then provide an
introduction to IFC and a summary of applicable IFC policies. Next, we
present an account of the major events related to the case study at hand:
two IFC loans to the Company and the involvement of CI and other parties
from 1994 to the present. We conclude with a discussion of lessons
learned from this case study and specific proposals for a reform agenda at
IFC.
At its core, this case study concerns loans made by IFC to increase
significantly the efficiency and volume of oil extraction in a concession
that was grandfathered into a national park. The park in question was and
continues to be under sustained pressure from colonization. Over the
course of two loans, IFC funds were used to construct a pipeline from the
oil field in the park to a refinery outside the park and subsequently to
expand production at the oil field. The crux of our findings is that the
pipeline should have been constructed to follow the path of the existing
road previously used by the oil trucks. Instead, the pipeline crosses signifi-
cant stretches of primary tropical forest and has opened a new right-of-
way into the park without adequate measures to protect the park from
new colonization. It is our judgment that a stronger set of IFC lending
policies, a better environmental impact assessment, and greater public
consultation would have led to a different outcome. IFC should adopt
stronger policies to avoid such environmentally damaging investments in
the future. As extractive industries and related infrastructure push further
into tropical wilderness areas, publicly financed international agencies
like IFC have a particular responsibility to ensure that their loans have a
net positive impact on environmental protection.
This case study is complicated by the fact that it includes two sepa-
rate IFC loans. In the authors' view, there was a progression in the degree
of openness and transparency on the part of IFC over the three years
spanning the two loans discussed. Many of the improved practices by IFC
management and staff in the second loan are a reflection of the new lead-
ership that World Bank President James Wolfensohn has brought to IFC.
The initial loan raises numerous and clear issues related to the reform
agenda at IFC. The second loan presents a more complex set of issues
because 1) IFC also utilized a set of public consultation and environmental
impact practices that mark an improvement over those used in the first
loan, and 2) the activities funded presented a narrower range of environ-
mental risks. Matters are further complicated by the fact that the Com-
pany recently decided to prepay its loans to IFC-a step that effectively
precludes IFC from any further involvement in the project, including the
ability to monitor and oversee the environmental performance of its loans.
In the final analysis, the case study presents IFC as an institution in
need of reform. Its environmental assessment process and operational pol-
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icies to protect tropical forests and critical habitats did not lead to a pro-
ject that contributes meaningfully to protection of a globally important
national park. On the contrary, IFC funds were effectively used to open up
a new pathway for colonization into a park that already faces considerable
threat to its viability. This case study also points to shortcomings in IFC
information disclosure policies-policies that allow IFC to protect itself
from certain forms of public criticism but do not effectively serve the pub-
lic interest. We explore these issues and recommendations in greater
depth after presenting background information on this case study.
Conservation and development decisions made in Guatemala and
throughout the world are made against an intricate and dynamic socioeco-
nomic and political backdrop. It is essential to acknowledge that the de-
velopment activities financed by IFC were legal under the laws of
Guatemala. Although controversial, the Company complied with applica-
ble laws when constructing and operating its oil facilities. The policies of
Guatemala, or any other country, may not be congruent with those of IFC
and the larger World Bank Group. Indeed, there is a confusing and contra-
dictory regulatory framework in Guatemala. Nevertheless, it is IFC's re-
sponsibility to apply its own natural resources policies and, in any case,
support the course of action that results in the least environmentally dam-
aging option.
This case study raises numerous questions about the role of govern-
ments, development agencies, the private sector, conservation organiza-
tions, and local communities, but the authors do not attempt to address all
pertinent questions in this Article. While acknowledging the larger com-
plexities, the authors have chosen to focus on the narrow issue of IFC's
role in such matters, with the goal of improving that institution's environ-
mental performance.
II. BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on relevant conserva-
tion and oil development issues in northern Guatemala. It begins with a
discussion of conservation measures undertaken to protect the natural re-
sources of the region. It then provides a brief history of oil development in
the region. Finally, it concludes with an introduction to Basic Resources
International Limited (Company) and a specific discussion of the Xan oil
field and the Company's operations there.
A. The Maya Biosphere Reserve and Laguna del Tigre National Park
Spanning nearly 2.1 million hectares of the northern Guatemalan de-
partment of Pet6n and abutting Mexico to the north and west and Belize to
the east, the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR) is an area of primary lowland
tropical forests and expansive wetlands. It contains globally important bi-
ological diversity4 and is host to significant archaeological treasures, such
4 BIODIVERSITY SUPPORT PROGRAM ET AL., A REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF GEOGRAPHIC PRIORITIES
FOR BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN xxi (1995); E. DINER.
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as the Tikal ruins, dating back to the height of Mayan civilization. Created
in 1990, the MBR was the cornerstone of a Guatemalan government plan
to preserve its country's vast biological wealth and stem the tide of uncon-
trolled logging, colonization, agriculture, and infrastructure that was
spreading into the forests of the Pet~n. 5 The heart of the reserve is its
nearly 800,000 hectares of strictly protected core zones, which include na-
tional parks and biotopes (wildlife refuges) reserved solely for conserva-
tion.6 The rest of the reserve is composed of about 841,000 hectares of
multiple-use zones-designed to accommodate environmentally sound
production of timber, tourism development, and nontimber forest prod-
ucts-and a buffer zone of about 480,000 hectares.7
The biggest core zone within the MBR is also Guatemala's largest na-
tional park, the 340,000-hectare Laguna del Tigre National Park and Bio-
tope (Laguna del Tigre),8 which was established at the same time as the
reserve in 1990. The park contains the largest protected freshwater wet-
land in Central America and has been recognized as a "wetland of interna-
tional importance" under the 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands of
International Importance, ratified by Guatemala in 1990.9 Laguna del Tigre
STEIN ET AL., A CONSERVATION ASSESSMENT OF THE TERRESTRIAL ECOREGIONS OF LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 66, map 7 (1995).
5 STEVEN A. SADER, FOREST MONITORING AND SATELLITE CHANGE DETECTION ANALYSIS OF
THE MAYA BIOSPHERE RESERVE, PET9N DISTRICT, GUATEMALA 1, 19 (1996) (final report submit-
ted to CI and the U.S. Agency for International Development).
6 Id. at 19.
7 Id.
8 Id.
9 The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, Feb. 2, 1971, T.I.A.S. No.
11,084 [hereinafter Convention]. The convention was signed in Ramsar, Iran in 1971 and
entered into force on December 21, 1975 Id. at 1. AS of November 18, 1998 there were 113
contracting parties, with 956 wetland sites totaling more than 70 million hectares (ha). Ram-
sar Convention on Wetlands (visited Nov. 18, 1998) <http://www.iucn.org/themes/ramsar>
[hereinafter Ramsar Convention]. Article Two of the convention requires signatories to des-
ignate at least one wetland in their country for inclusion in the List of Wetlands of Interna-
tional Importance. Convention, supra, at 5-6. Article Three requires them to formulate and
implement their planning to promote the conservation of wetlands included in the list. Id.
And, Article Four requires them to promote wetlands conservation by establishing nature
reserves on listed as well as unlisted wetlands. Id. The convention further states in Article
Four that countries should not delete or reduce the boundaries of listed wetlands unless
compelled to do so by an urgent national interest. Id. at 6. In the event that a country is
compelled to reduce a listed wetland or remove it altogether, the convention states in Article
Three that the country should notify the entity performing continuing bureau duties of the
change. Id. In addition, under Article Four, the country should compensate for any loss of
wetlandg resources as far as possible, in particular by creating new nature reserves for wa-
terfowl and for remaining portions of the original wetlands habitat. Id.
The convention came into force in Guatemala on October 26, 1990. Ramsar Conven-
tion, supra. Guatemala currently includes three wetlands on the Ramsar list, the largest of
which is the 48,372-hectare Laguna del Tigre biotope, located inside the boundaries of
Laguna del Tigre National Park. Id. The Laguna del Tigre site is also included on the Mon-
treux Record, a record established at the Fourth Meeting of the Conference of the Con-
tracting Parties which lists "sites which have incurred or are being threatened by change in
ecological character." Id.
1999]
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is also an important wintering ground for North American migratory
birds. 10
B. Legal Framework for Protected Areas Management in the Pet6n
The natural and cultural resources within the Maya Biosphere Re-
serve are administered and managed by the Guatemalan National Council
for Protected Areas (CONAP)" according to the mandate established in
Congressional Decrees 4-89 and 5-90.12 CONAP and the National Commis-
sion on the Environment (CONAMA) are housed in the President's office
and serve as the country's principal environmental agencies.' 3 Within the
reserve, the Laguna del Tigre, San Miguel La Palotada, and Dos Lagunas
biotopes are administered by the Center for Conservation Studies at the
University of San Carlos (CECON). 14
The Maya Biosphere Reserve is made up of parts of five different
Guatemalan municipalities: Melchor de Mencos, Flores, San Jos6, San An-
drds, and La Libertad. 15 The Laguna del Tigre National Park is contained
entirely within the Municipality of San Andr6s. According to Guatemalan
municipal codes, a municipality has the right and responsibility to oversee
land use and environmental issues and to assist institutions dedicated to
environmental conservation operating within its boundaries.16
C. Oil Development in the Pet6n
Estimates of Guatemala's oil reserves vary widely, from an oil indus-
try estimate of 16 million barrels of exploitable reserves, to the Ministry of
Energy and Mines's 1993 claim of 351 million barrels of proven reserves
10 Olga Herrera-MacBryde & Jane Villa-Lobos, Peten Region and Maya Biosphere Re-
serve (last modified Jan. 22, 1998) <http://www.si.edu/botany/projects/centres/peten.htm>.
11 The Reserve is also administered in coordination with USAID, The Nature Conser-
vancy (TNC), Conservation International, and CARE International. Juanita Sundberg, NGO
Landscapes: Conservation in the Maya Biosphere Reserve, Peten Guatemala (last modified
Nov. 1997) <http://www.txinfinet.com/mader/planeta/l197/l197maya.html>.
12 Herrera-MacBryde & Villa-Lobos, supra note 10.
13 Documentos Basicos de la Comisidn Nacional del Medio Ambiente de Guatemala
(CONAMA) (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.ecouncil.ac/centroan/conama/presl.htm>.
14 CONsEJo NACIONAL DE AREAS PROTEGIDAS, DECRETO NtMERO 5-90: RESERVA DE LA BI6S-
FERA MAYA 8 (1992) [hereinafter CONsEJo NACIONAL]. The Master Plan for the Maya Bio-
sphere Reserve was approved by the Guatemalan National Council for Protected Areas
(CONAP) in March 1992 in Guatemala City.
15 Id. at 2.
16 ALEJANDRA SOBENES, FUNDACION CONSERVACION INTERNACIONAL/CI PROPETtN, OBLIGA-
CIONES DE LAS MUNICIPALIDADES EN LA PROTECCi6N DEL MEDio AMBiENTE 4, 5 (1996) (citing A.
SOBENES, ORGANIZACION PANAMERICA DE LA SALUD OPS/OMS, LINEAMIENTOS PARA LA ELAno.-
CION DE PLANES DE ASEO URBANO: ASPECTOS LEGALES (1994) (summarizing the C6digo Munici-
pal (58-88 del Congreso de la Republica de Guatemala, Articulo 7))).
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and 1.43 billion barrels of probable reserves.17 Guatemala currently con-
sumes about 40,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil.' 8
Although oil was discovered in Guatemala as early as the 1930s, ac-
tive exploration did not begin until the 1970s, and commercial production
did not begin until 1979.19 During the early to middle 1980s, several inter-
national oil companies, including Amoco, Exxon, and Basic Resources,
came to Guatemala and found large fields in the Petdn.20 However, Guate-
mala's civil war soon began to affect oil operations in the country, and all
three companies stopped their operations in the middle to late 1980s.2 1 As
the political situation began to stabilize in the early 1990s, the Guatemalan
Ministry of Energy and Mines again started actively to pursue bids for new
oil exploration and development. 2 To date, oil contracts have been
granted, or are about to be granted, for much of the area of the Pet6n.23
Several of these concessions overlap with core protected areas within the
MBR, despite the fact that the master plan for the reserve allows oil devel-
opment only in multiple-use or buffer zones.2 4
1. The Company
Although there are several companies exploring for oil in the MBR,
the Company is currently the only active producer in Guatemala.25 The
Company is a small' oil company that was incorporated in the Bahamas in
October 1967 with its headquarters in Paris. Its only production operation
is in Guatemala. In 1970, the Company received the first petroleum explo-
ration concession granted by the government of Guatemala for rights to
explore in the region of Alta Verapaz. 26 The Company began commercial
production at this concession in 1979. At the time of application for its
loans from IFC, the majority shareholder in the Company was Basic Hold-
17 Liza Grandia, Crude Destruction: The Threat of Oil to Sustainable Development in the
Maya Biosphere Reserve 17-18 (Dec. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Professor
David Lumnsdaine, Yale University).
18 Fiona Ortiz, Guatemala Oil Production Sees Sharp Increase, REUTERS, June 13, 1996
(on file with authors).
19 Grandia, supra note 17, at 17.
20 Anson Ng, Enthusiasm Runs Out in Guatemala Oil Industry, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 25,
1987, at 14.
21 Id.
22 Although the major oil companies have not yet returned to Guatemala, there are sev-
eral smaller companies, in addition to Basic, exploring there today, including Triton Energy
Corp (Dallas), Ceiba Petroleo S.A. (a local partnership between Canada's Seine River and
the U.S.'s Pensa Inc.), Consolidated Ramrod Gold Corp. (Canada), and Mexpetrol (a partner-
ship between U.S. and Mexican companies). Ortiz, supra note 18.
23 MIGUEL ANGEL CARBALLO HERNANDEZ, BASIC RESOURCES INT'L (BAHAMAS) LTD., EVALUA-
CI6N DE EFECTOS ACUMULATIVOS EN EL CONTRATO 2-85, AREAS CONEXAS Y ALREDEDORES, at 8-9
(May 1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter CONTRATO 2-85].
24 CONSEJO NACIONAL, supra note 14, at 9-10.
25 Ortiz, supra note 18.
26 BASIC PETROLEUM INT'L, LTD., COMMISSION FILE NUMBER 0-11923, FORM 20-F ANNUAL RE-
PORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE
FISCAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1996, at 2-3 (1997) [hereinafter 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO
SEC].
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ings Limited (BHL), a Bahamian company owned by officers and directors
of the Company, General Oriental Investments Limited, and other inves-
tors.27 In June 1996, the Company made a public offering of one million
ordinary shares, generating net proceeds of about $27.5 million.28 In May
1997, the Company entered into a merger agreement with Norcen Energy
Resources Limited, a Canadian corporation, and SAN Limited, a wholly
owned subsidiary of Norcen based in the Bahamas. 29 Norcen became the
majority owner of the Company by the end of 1997.30
2. Xan Oilfield
Today, the vast majority of Guatemala's current oil output of more
than 20,000 bpd is produced at the Company's Xan oil field,31 the site dis-
cussed in this case study. The Xan field is located in the northwest corner
of the Pet6n, within the Laguna del Tigre National Park.32 The Company
began working the Xan field in 1985, shortly before the withdrawal of all
other oil companies from Guatemala.33
Although, by law, oil development is not allowed within the core
zones of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, 34 the Company's Xan operations
were grandfathered into the national park because the concession was
granted in 1985, five years before the reserve and park were created in
1990.35 The Company's concession under the 1985 contract covered about
three percent of the current area of Laguna del Tigre National Park.36
However, in 1992, the Company was granted a second concession that ex-
panded its concession area to cover more than sixty percent of the park.37
This contract was signed two years after the establishment of Laguna del
Tigre as a national park and a core zone within the Maya Biosphere
Reserve.38
The oil produced by the Company at the Xan field is a heavy, sour
crude with a high sulfur content that must either be refined before sale or
27 As of 1993, Basic Holdings Ltd. owned 29.5% of ordinary shares of Basic Resources
International Limited (Company), General Oriental Investments Ltd. owned 16.7% of shares,
in addition to its 30% interest in BHL, and various officers and directors of the Company
owned another 4.7% of shares. BASIC PETROLEUM INT'L, LTD., COMMISSION FILE NUMBER 0-
11923, FORM 20-F ANNUAL REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 13 oR 15(D) OF THE SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 FOR THE FIScAL YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 1995, at 36-37 (1996) [herein-
after 1995 ANNUAL REPORT TO SEC].
28 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO SEC, supra note 26, at 2.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 3.
31 Ortiz, supra note 18.
32 CONSEJO NACIONAL, supra note 14, at 33.
33 Ng, supra note 20, at 14; 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO SEC, supra note 26, at 21.
34 CONSEJO NACIONAL, supra note 14, at 9.
35 Memorandum from Victor Bullen, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Bureau for Pol'y and Pro-
gram Coordination, Office of Env't, to Roberta Mahoney, U.S. Agency for Int'l Dev., Bureau
for Pol'y and Program Coordination, Office of Env't 4 (July 15, 1996) (on file with authors).
36 Id.
37 Id. at 2-3.
38 Id.
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used to produce asphalt.3 9 Almost all of this crude is exported to the
United States for refining,40 although some is processed in the town of La
Libertad at the Company's minirefinery, which began full-time production
in January 1994. 41 The Xan field is connected to La Libertad by a 76-mile,
12-inch pipeline with a capacity of 30,000 bpd.42 At the refinery, asphalt is
produced for the local and other Central American markets, and heavy
crude oil is upgraded into lighter, more commercially viable crude oil.43
After refining, the lighter crude is transported another 67 miles to Raxrujjd,
where it joins up with the Company's Rubelsanto pipeline and travels an-
other 143 miles to the Caribbean port of Puerto Santo Tomis.44
III. SUMMARY OF RELEVANT IFC POLICIES
In this section, we provide a review of relevant International Finance
Corporation (IFC) policies and related issues, organized around the fol-
lowing subject areas: 1) the relationship between IFC and World Bank op-
erational policies, 2) natural habitats policies, 3) forestry policies, 4)
public consultation procedures, with specific emphasis on environmental
impact reviews, 5) transparency and access to information, and 6) IFC
capacity.
IFC is the private sector lending arm of the World Bank Group.
Although the president of the World Bank is also the president of IFC, it is
legally and financially independent from the other World Bank agencies.4 5
IFC is owned by its 174 member countries, which contribute funding and
determine the agency's policies and activities. The five largest sharehold-
ers are the United States, with 23.9%, Japan, with 6.3%, Germany, with
5.3%, France, with 5.0% and the United Kingdom, with 5.4%.46 IFC's man-
date is to promote economic development by encouraging private sector
investment in developing countries. To achieve this goal, the agency works
in partnership with private investors and advises governments on policy
reform to attract private investment. Since its establishment in 1956, IFC
has provided more than $15 billion in financing for 1852 companies in 129
countries, making it the largest multilateral source of financing for private
sector projects in the developing world.47
A. The Relationship Between IFC and World Bank Operational Policies
For the purposes of this discussion, we defme "World Bank regula-
tions and policies" as those that pertain to the IBRD and IDA, and "IFC
39 1996 ANNUAL REPORT TO SEC, supra note 26, at 4.
40 Id. at 10.
41 Id. at 4.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 8.
45 About IFC (visited Nov. 11, 1998) <http://www.ifc.org/main/utmgeneral.html>.
46 Statement of Capital Stock and Voting Power (visited Nov. 19, 1998) <http://
www.ifc.org/AR97/pdf/Finl3l.pdf>; <http://www.ifc.org/AR97/pdf/Fin132.pdf>.
47 About IFC, supra note 45.
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regulations and policies" as those that apply to IFC only-even though
IFC is technically a part of the World Bank Group. Strictly speaking, the
degree to which IFC must follow World Bank regulations is not clear.
48
Policy documents state that IFC does not consider itself subject to World
Bank procedures,49 yet IFC states it does have a commitment to follow
World Bank operational policies and directives.5 0 The confusion may stem
from the IFC policy document Environmental Analysis and Review of
Projects,51 which includes contradictory formulations of its policy on
World Bank operational directives.5 2 In addition, the Independent Review
of the International Finance Corporation's Compliance with Applicable
World Bank Group Environmental and Social Requirements53 conducted
by the Pangue Audit Team, as well as the authors' experience, indicate
that interpretations vary.54 Perhaps the safest characterization of IFC's
commitment to follow World Bank operational policies and directives is
that IFC, at most, considers itself bound by "the spirit and intent" of these
policies.55 In some cases, it does not consider itself bound at all.
IFC reserves the right to pass special guidelines to accommodate its
particular project cycle, which is designed for private- rather than public-
sector lending. 56 IFC cites both the need to protect proprietary informa-
tion provided by potential sponsors and the need to move quickly to take
advantage of rapidly emerging business opportunities as the basis for devi-
ations from World Bank Group policies.57 The following sections explain
how IFC policies differ from World Bank policies on information disclo-
sure and environmental assessment in important respects.
B. Natural Habitats Policy
World Bank Operational Policy Note 11.02 (OPN 11.02) addresses the
impacts of lending on wildlands and natural habitats.5 8 In 1995, OPN 11.02
48 JAY D. HAIR ET AL., PANGUE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT (CHILE): AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW
OF THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORPORATION'S COMPLIANCE WITH APPLICABLE WORLD BANK
GROUP ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL REQUIREMENTS 24-27 (1997). IFC staff acknowledges that
there is substantial ambiguity regarding the terminology it uses and the degree to which it is
subject to the World Bank's policies and directives. Id. at 24 n.2.
49 Id. at 27; INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF
PROJECTS 7 (1993) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS].
50 ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS, supra note 49, at 7.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 7, 9. The document states on page 7 that "IFC projects must comply with all
relevant environmental policies, both explicitly stated policies and policies embedded in the
Operational Directives" but on page 9 states that the document includes "World Bank envi-
ronmental policies and guidelines which should be considered in an environmental analy-
sis." Id. (emphasis added).
53 HAIR ET AL., supra note 48, at 24-27.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 31.
56 Jannik Lindbaek, IFC Policy on Disclosure of Information: A Message From the Exec-
utive Vice President (visited Feb. 7, 1999) <http://www.ifc.org/ifc/main/html/disclosl.html>.
57 Id.
58 World Bank Operational Manual: Operational Policy 4.04 (visited March 15, 1999)
<http://www.ifc.org/enviro/OP_404.html>.
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was converted to Operational Policy 4.04 (OP 4.04).59 The revised OP 4.04
states that "[t]he Bank's economic and sector work includes identification
of (a) natural habitat issues and special needs for natural habitat conser-
vation (particularly critical natural habitats); and (b) measures for protect-
ing such areas in the context of the country's development strategy."60 OP
4.04 also states that "[t]he Bank does not support projects involving the
significant conversion of natural habitats unless there are no feasible alter-
natives for the project and its siting, and comprehensive analysis demon-
strates that overall benefits from the project substantially outweigh the
environmental costs." 6 1 In such a case, the World Bank requires mitigation
measures, such as "minimizing habitat loss (for example, strategic habitat
retention and post-development restoration) and establishing and main-
taining an ecologically similar protected area."62
C. Forestry Policy
The World Bank's forestry policy is laid out in Operational Policy 4.36
(OP 4.36).63 This policy affirms the Bank's goal to "reduce deforestation,
enhance the environmental contribution of forested areas, promote affor-
estation, reduce poverty, and encourage economic development."64 OP
4.36 also states that "in forest areas of high ecological value, [the Bank]
finances only preservation and light, nonextractive use of forest re-
sources" and that the Bank "will not finance projects that contravene any
relevant international environmental agreement."65
D. IFC Public Consultation and Environmental Impact
Assessment Procedures
During initial project review, IFC's Environment Division classifies a
project according to environmental impact category and justifies the cate-
gorization.66 Category A is the classification that attaches to the most envi-
ronmentally sensitive projects-those projects that may result in "diverse
and significant environmental impacts."6 7 During internal initial project re-
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 The World Bank Operational Manual: Operational Policy 4.36 (visited Jan. 23, 1999)
<http://www.ifc.org/enviro/OP_436.html>.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYsIs, supra note 49, annex A, at 1.
67 Id. annex H, at 1. Annex H also describes Category A projects as those that are "likely
to have significant adverse impacts that may be sensitive, irreversible, and diverse." Id. an-
nex H, at 2. The discrepancy between the two definitions within the same annex is not
explained. Annex H further states that Category A projects are those in which "impacts are
likely to be comprehensive, broad, sector-wide, or precedent setting" and that "[i]mpacts
generally result from a major component of the project and affect the area as a whole or an
entire sector." Id. Category B projects are those that "may result in specific environmental
impacts and require adherence to certain predetermined performance standards, guidelines,
or design criteria to avoid or mitigate impacts." Id. annex H, at 1. "Although a full environ-
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view, IFC also summarizes the environmental concerns raised by the pro-
ject, identifies additional information necessary for a complete analysis,
and describes the standards against which the project will be reviewed
(including host country requirements, internationally recognized stan-
dards, and World Bank policies).68 If the Investment Review Committee
then approves the project for evaluation and appraisal, the project is listed
in the Monthly Operations Report, which is distributed to the board and
includes a description of the environmental issues.
During the appraisal stage for Category A projects, the appraisal team
gathers more specific environmental data and requires sponsors to pre-
pare an environmental assessment (EA). During EA preparation, the spon-
sor must consult with local interested or affected parties and make the
draft EA available locally, at a public place, and in a form and language
accessible to interested or affected parties. The sponsor must also provide
IFC with a final version of the EA and a summary of the EA in English and
must give IFC permission to release the final EA publicly and without en-
dorsement sixty days prior to the proposed board date for the project.
Finally, IFC makes a final determination regarding the transparency of the
EA consultation process and whether all environmental issues have been
satisfactorily addressed. This procegs is called "environmental
clearance. 69
IFC's EA preparation and consultation process differs from the World
Bank's, which is detailed in Operational Directive 4.01 (OD 4.01), in sev-
eral important respects. First, unlike IFC's policies, OD 4.01 requires envi-
ronmental impact assessments to be complete prior to the appraisal stage.
The difference in the IFC loan approval process is based on the argument
that IFC requires greater procedural flexibility than the World Bank be-
cause many sponsors approach IFC well after initial feasibility studies
have been initiated or even completed. IFC also differs from the World
Bank in that it does not require a sponsor to incorporate country environ-
mental studies, overall policy frameworks, or the institutional capabilities
of the country into the environmental assessment because the projects do
not involve the public sector. However, like many Category A projects, the
project addressed in this Article explicitly involved the public sector be-
cause it included development of public resources underlying protected
public lands.
mental assessment is not required, environmental analysis is required." Id. Environmental
analysis for Category B projects is included in the Environmental Review Summary, which is
released no later than 30 days prior to board consideration. Lindbaek, supra note 56. Cate-
goryF1 projects are projects that "may include financing a variety of subprojects that may
result in environmental impacts" and "[vierification that the financial intermediary is capa-
ble of and committed to conducting environmental review of subprojects is required." ENVI-
RONMENTAL ANALYsis, supra note 49, annex H, at 1. Category C projects are projects that do
not result in any environmental impact. Id.
68 Id. annex G, at 2.
69 Id. annex A, at 2.
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E. Access to Information
For outside parties to judge the environmental performance of a
given loan, it is necessary to have access to the relevant documents. IFC
makes several documents containing environmental data available to the
public.70 The Summary of Project Information (SPI) provides baseline in-
formation on a project prior to approval, including environmental catego-
rization, project cost, sponsors, and companies involved.71 However, IFC
states that, although it attempts to make SPIs available thirty days prior to
presentation of the project to the board, it retains the right to withhold an
SPI or release it less than thirty days prior to board consideration if com-
pelled by changing "market conditions." 72 As mentioned above, IFC also
releases environmental assessments sixty days prior to board approval,
but it must have permission from a client to do so. It retains the right to
withhold the EA altogether "in exceptional cases where timing is critical
and management is satisfied that World Bank environmental policies and
guidelines have been met."73 Furthermore, unlike the World Bank, which
does not place any restrictions dn the release of Project Information Doc-
uments, Monthly Operational Summaries, or Environmental Data Sheets,
IFC does not release either Staff Appraisal Reports or Monthly Operations
Reports.74 Thus, it is possible that a highly environmentally sensitive pro-
ject would meet with IFC approval without ever being subject to public
scrutiny.75
Perhaps more importantly, although IFC requires the sponsor to in-
clude information from a project-specific environmental audit, an environ-
mental management plan, or environmental mitigation plan in an
environmental assessment, it does not make public the environmental
conditions included in the loan covenant. The environmental conditions
are contractually binding requirements, such as monitoring and mitigation,
that IFC can impose as a condition of granting the loan.
F. IFC Capacity for Environmental Management and Enforcement
Under IFC internal procedures, a desk officer is responsible for pro-
viding environmental clearance to the investment officer. To undertake
this task, the desk officer must review the technical details of a complex
document involving a variety of environmental and social disciplines.
IV. THE CASE OF IFC LENDING FOR OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PETPIN
This section introduces Conservation International (CI) and then
turns to a brief chronological outline of the major events in this case study
related to the two loans made by IFC to the Company.
70 INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP., POICY ON DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 14-15 (1997).
71 Id.
72 Id. at 8.
73 Id. at 9.
74 Id. at 5, 8-9.
75 Id. at 7-10, 14-16.
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CI is a Washington-based, nonprofit, international conservation or-
ganization.7 6 CI operates a sixty-person field office in the Pet6n, where it
conducts a variety of conservation activities, 77 including the development
and marketing of ecotourism and nontimber forest products. These prod-
ucts include renewable plant materials such as chicle (a natural chewing
gum base), xate (an ornamental fern), allspice, and medicinal plants. 7 CI
also has a mandate from the Guatemalan National Council for Protected
Areas (CONAP), financed by USAID's Maya Biosphere Reserve project
and the Canadian International Development Research Center's policy
monitoring and research project, to assist in efforts to protect and manage
Laguna del Tigre National Park.79 CI is a field conservation organization
with substantial technical expertise in protected areas, management, and
economic development. It recently undertook in-depth policy research on
oil and gas exploration and production activities in tropical forests and
published a manual of best management practices and policies.8 0 In the
context of the Maya Biosphere Reserve project, CI also has a mandate to
assist in the development of appropriate conservation policy in Guatemala
as it relates to the Reserve, including oil and gas policy.8 1
A. IFC's First Loan to the Company
The Company first applied for IFC funding in 1993.82 The loan was
designed to finance the expansion of production at its Xan field from 8500
bpd to 11,200 bpd and to build a 120-kilometer pipeline to transport oil
from Xan to its refinery in La Libertad, thereby replacing the current sys-
tem of tanker trucks.8 3 The $20 million lending package was approved in
1994.4
The planned $13 million, 12-inch pipeline was intended to save about
$5 million per year by reducing transport costs from $4 per barrel to $1.63
per barrel.8 5 Leaving the oil field, the proposed pipeline route would fol-
low the existing road for approximately twenty kilometers, then split from
the road while still within the borders of Laguna del Tigre National Park
and continue over land through previously undisturbed forest, wetlands,
76 Conservation International Website (visited Nov. 23, 1998) <http://
www.conservation.org>.
77 ProPetbn, CI's Guatemala office, has six main areas of conservation activities: land
and resource management, enterprise development, park management, research and moni-
toring, policy, and community outreach and development. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 AMY B. ROSENFELD ET AL., REINVENTING THE WELL: APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING THE ENvI-
RONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACT OF OIL DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS (1997).
81 Conservation International Website, supra note 76.
82 International Finance Corp., IFC Invests in Guatemalan Oil Producer (June 21, 1994)
(IFC Press Release No. 94/109) (on file with authors).
3 Id.
84 Id. The package included a $10 million loan, a syndicated loan of $6 million from
international commercial banks, and an equity investment by IFC of $4 million, making IFC
a five percent stakeholder in the Company. Id.85 BASIC PETROLEUM INT'L LTD., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 4-5, 9 (1994).
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rivers, and streams, into the multiple use zone of the Maya Biosphere Re-
serve.86 Once the pipeline crossed the San Pedro River, it would be
outside the park and in the buffer zone.8 7 The pipeline route would create
a new right-of-way through the multiple use buffer zone and provide a new
point of entry into the park itself.88
CI learned of the IFC loan89 and the planned construction of the pipe-
line in mid-1994, after IFC had already approved the loan.90 Shortly there-
after, representatives of CI asked to meet with IFC to discuss the project.
CI and IFC met in November 1994 and in early 1995. At these meetings, CI
expressed concern about the location and siting of the pipeline and the
potential for colonization along the new access route. CI also noted that
the project's EA neither considered alternative pipeline paths nor poten-
tial indirect environmental impacts of the loan, such as colonization. CI
raised the additional concerns in reference to the EA, including the follow-
ing: no on-the-ground archaeological analysis, no discussion of potential
sabotage of the above-ground pipeline, weak socioeconomic and baseline
biodiversity analyses, and insufficient provisions for local consultation
and public disclosure. In essence, CI argued the pipeline financing was
already approved by IFC and local stakeholders had not been sufficiently
consulted in the loan approval process. CI specifically recommended that
IFC move to reroute the pipeline to follow the existing road between the
Xan oil field and La Libertad and undertake a proactive program to miti-
gate the environmental impact of the project.
In response, IFC indicated that these issues had been addressed in
the EA process and changes in the siting of the pipeline were hiot possible.
With regard to the separate issue of additional investments in mitigation
measures, IFC offered to act as a broker among itself, CI, Guatemalan
NGOs, and the Company and encouraged CI to work with its local part-
ners to develop an appropriate mitigation plan. In May 1995, although the
funds were already allocated and the pipeline had largely been built, CI
submitted a proposed mitigation plan on behalf of CONAP, the Center for
Conservation Studies at the University of San Carlos (CECON), and the
Municipality of San Andr6s in the hopes that the potential direct and indi-
rect impacts of the pipeline might be contained. The main concern ex-
pressed in the mitigation plan was uncontrolled colonization in the park
resulting from local demographic pressure and increased access via the
pipeline trajectory.9 1
86 CoNTRATo 2-85, supra note 23, fig. 11.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 CI learned about the loan in Washington. CI's field office in Guatemala was neither
informed of nor consulted regarding the loan, despite being a stakeholder in the region.
90 Basic Petroleum Int'l, Ltd., Basic Petroleum Will Build New Pipeline; $16.5 Million
in New Financing Obtained; Board Approves 3:1 Stock Split (June 6, 1994) (Basic Petro-
leum Int'l, Ltd. Press Release) (on file with authors).
91 THE GUATEMALAN NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR 'PROTECTED AREAS (CONAP) ET AL., MITIGATION
OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF BASIC RESOURCES'
PIPELINE THROUGH THE LAGUNA DEL TIGRE NATIONAL PARK, PET9N, GUATEMALA 2 (1995) (miti-
gation proposal presented to Basic Resources International Limited) (on file with authors).
1999]
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
The Company declined to accept the plan in mid-July, objecting to its
focus on the effects of new pathways into the park and noting that the
Company's only responsibility was to comply with Guatemalan law, not to
provide funding for the protection of the Maya Biosphere Reserve.9 2 Con-
struction of the pipeline was completed by the Company on July 21,
1995.93 Two weeks later, CECON wrote to IFC independently, detailing its
concerns regarding illegal hunting, forest fires, and a lack of obligatory
monitoring activities within the national park.94
B. IFC's Second Loan to the Company
In late 1995, CI learned through informal channels that the Company
had recently applied for additional funding from IFC. The new financing
request, totaling $24 million in long- and short-term loans, would fund
both the expansion of production at the Xan oil field (from 13,000 bpd to
20,000 bpd by 1997) and construction of a 22,000 bpd, 109.5-kilometer ex-
tension of the existing pipeline (from the refinery at La Libertad to
Raxrj ). 95 Although the proposed pipeline was to be constructed outside
of the Maya Biosphere Reserve, CI wanted to ensure that the expansion of
operations at the Xan field would not fundamentally damage the core of
the park and that the operations could be integrated into the broader man-
agement plans for the park.
In January 1996, CI contacted IFC and reiterated the need for proac-
tive mitigation of the project's environmental impacts. Later that month,
representatives of CI, IFC, and the Company met in Washington and
agreed to conduct a joint field assessment. CI also indicated its intention
The mitigation proposal recommended that the Company contribute $443,000 annually to a
fund that would finance four mitigation strategies: the construction of strategically placed
guardhouses to patrol and control the area within the park; the development of environmen-
tal education in communities in and around the park; the monitoring of changes in popula-
tion, land use, fire and other factors within the park; and the establishment of a long-term
endowment fund that would take effect after the Company finished its operations in the
Petdn. Id. at 4. The Company's contribution was to be distributed as follows: $152,000 per
year to CONAP, $145,000 per year to the Center for Conservation Studies at the University of
San Carlos (CECON), and $146,000 per year to the Municipality of San Andrs. Id. at 7-9.
Conservation International did not seek any funding for its ongoing involvement in this pro-
cess or its conservation activities in Guatemala.
92 Memorandum from CONAP, CECON, Municipality of San Andrds, and Conservation
Int'l to Basic Resources (July 11, 1995) (attachment to Letter from Rodolfo E. Sosa de Le6n,
President of Basic Resources Int'l Ltd. to James D. Nations, Vice President for Mexico and
Central America, Conservation Int'l (July 11, 1995)) (on file with authors).
93 Letter from Lic. Ismael Ponciano G6mez, Director, CECON, to Hugh Henry-May,
Country Manager for Central America and Caribbean, International Finance Corporation 1
(Aug. 2, 1995) (on file with authors).
94 Id. at attachment.
95 MIGUEL ANGEL CARBALLO HERNANDEZ, BASIC RESOURCES INT'L (BAHAMAs) LTD., EsTUDio
DE EVALUACI6N DEL IMPACTO AMBIENTAL (EIA) SIGNIFICATIVO DEL PROYECTO "RAMAL LA LIBERTAD-
RAXRUJA DEL SISTEMA ESTACIONARIO DE TRANSPORTE DE HIDROCARBUROS, CONTRATO 1-85, DE BA-
SIC RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL (BAHAMAS) LIMITED, DEPARTAMENTOS DE EL PET8N Y ALTA VER-
APAZ, GUATEMALA" (1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter CONTRATO 1-85]. The new
segment of pipeline would link the Company's two existing segments and completely elimi-
nate the need for truck transport. Id.
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to closely review and provide comments on the second loan's environmen-
tal assessment. On April 15, the Company submitted its EA for public com-
ment to the World Bank's Public Information Center (PIC) in
Washington.96 Upon preliminary review of the EA and the environmental
management plan (EMP) based upon it, both CI and IFC indicated that the
EMP was unsatisfactory. IFC asked the Company to revise the EMP.97
The sixty-day period for public comments on the EA, required by IFC
procedures, was scheduled to close on June 15, one business day before
the planned date for IFC board consideration of the Company loan on
June 18.98 Nevertheless, IFC staff notified CI in early May that, in order to
meet a printing deadline for circulation of board documents, environmen-
tal clearance was required on the loan by June 3.99 In addition, the revised
EMP was not made available until May 20.100 CI submitted its comments
on the EMP on May 31101 and several days later wrote to the U.S. Execu-
tive Director at the World Bank to request postponement of board consid-
eration of the loan if a new EMP was not completed and available for
review. 102
Subsequent to Cl's letter, IFC agreed on June 4 that environmental
clearance would not be given until there was an agreement between the
96 Conrad Reining, Summary of Conservation International's Dealings with Basic Re-
sources and the International Finance Corporation through August 1996, at 3 (Aug. 1996)
(internal memorandum) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Summary of Memo].
97 Id.; Memorandum from Mark Constantine, International Finance Corp., to Ian Bowles,
Vice President, Conservation Policy, Conservation Int'l 2 (Dec. 15, 1996) (on file with
authors).
98 Memorandum from Conrad Reining, Conservation Int'l, to Russ Mittermeier et al.,
Conservation Int'l 1 (June 3, 1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Memo to Mittermeier].
99 Telephone Interview by Amy Rosenfeld with Navin Mahajan, Investment Officer, Oil,
Gas & Mining Dep't, International Finance Corp. (May 29, 1996) [hereinafter Mahajan
Interview].
100 Summary of Memo, supra note 96.
101 See infra Appendix A. C's comments to the environmental management plan (EMP)
were organized around eight principles based on the World Bank's Operational Policies for
Natural Habitats. Letter from Russell A. Mittermeier, President, Conservation Int'l, to Mr.
Navin K. Mahajan, Investment Officer, Oil, Gas & Mining Dep't, International Finance Corp.,
and Mr. Ron B. Anderson, Environmental Specialist, Technical & Environment Dep't, Inter-
national Finance Corp. 3-9 (May 31, 1996) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Mittermeier
Letter]. IFC, as a member of the World Bank Group, is subject to these policies. The general
message of CI's comments was that the draft EMP was highly inadequate for a project in
such an important and sensitive location. Id. at 1. While the EMP offered a range of alternate
technologies and practices, it gave no specific guidance on choosing an alternative and did
not limit the discretion of the Company in doing so. Id. at 2. Furthermore, the EMP referred
to "international standards" but did not define these standards and did not adequately ad-
dress the indirect impacts of increased access to the park. Id.
102 The letter also asked that the Company be required to produce a new EMP, based on
the World Bank's Natural Habitats Policy, that the new EMP be included as a condition of
the loan agreement, and that the Company agree to fund certain activities to mitigate the
environmental impacts of the project. Letter from Russell A. Mittermeier, President, Conser-
vation Int'l, to Jan Piercy, U.S. Executive Director, World Bank 2-3 (June 3, 1996) (on file
with authors).
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Company and CI about an acceptable EMP. 103 Later that week, CI asked
IFC to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to that effect.10 4 In
its draft MOU, CI proposed a seven-week timeline for reaching this agree-
ment and achieving environmental clearance for a board meeting date in
late July.'0 5 IFC refused to sign the MOU and notified CI on June 7 that the
board meeting date had been moved back nine days to June 27.106 IFC
further stated that June 14 was the new date for environmental clearance
of the revised EMP and that CI technical staff would need to meet in Gua-
temala City to comment on the new EMP. 0 7
Recognizing that the revised timeline was unworkable, CI Chairman
Peter Seligmann wrote to World Bank President James Wolfensohn on
June 12. Seligmann's letter asked for Wolfensohn's intervention and laid
out four prerequisites for environmental clearance. 108 After this exchange
of letters, the board date was postponed further. On June 21, CI, the Com-
pany, and IFC met in Guatemala City,10 9 and on June 24, the Company
submitted a new EMP with substantially improved environmental manage-
ment procedures.' 10 On July 3, CI wrote to the Company and IFC, agreeing
that the most recent version of the EMP was acceptable, based on several
conditions."' Cl's conditions included a requirement that the Company
contribute $130,000 per year to a management fund and establish a per-
formance bond of $1 million; that IFC delay disbursement of the loan until
the National Commission on the Environment's (CONAMA's) and
CONAP's comments on the EMP were received and incorporated into the
103 Meeting with Ron Anderson, Environmental Specialist, Technical and Environment
Dep't, International Finance Corp., in Washington D.C. (June 4, 1996).
104 The memorandum of understanding (MOU) was to be signed by the Company and IFC
and witnessed by CI, CONAMA, CONAP, CECON, the Guatemalan Ministry of Energy and
Mines, the Municipality of San Andr~s, IDAEH, and the Nature Conservancy.
105 Draft Memorandum of Understanding between Basic Resources Int'l (Bahamas) Lim-
ited and The International Finance Corporation, (June 6, 1996) (on file with authors).
106 Summary of Memo, supra note 96.
107 Id.
108 The prerequisites for environmental clearance were: a signed MOU between the Com-
pany and IFC, witnessed by local stakeholders; an EMP for expansion of operations at the
Xan field that had been reviewed and accepted by CONAMA, CONAP and that adheres to the
MOU; assurance that the EMP was incorporated, in its entirety, into the investment agree-
ment and became a condition of the loan and enforceable under Guatemalan law; and agree-
ment by the Company to contribute funds to the management of Laguna del Tigre. The letter
also stated that Laguna del Tigre National Park clearly fit the World Bank definition of a
critical natural habitat and therefore IFC should adhere fully to the World Bank's Opera-
tional Policies for such habitats. Letter from Peter A. Seligmann, CEO and Chairman of the
Board, Conservation Int'l, to Mr. James D. Wolfensohn, President, World Bank Group 1-2
(June 12, 1996) (on file with authors).
109 Representatives of USAID-Guatemala, CONAMA, CONAP, and the Guatemalan Attor-
ney General's office also attended the June 21 meeting.
110 BASIC RESOURCES INT'L (BAHAMAS) LTD., PLAN GERENCIAL DE MANEJO AMBIENTAL Y SocI-
OcULTURAL (PGMA), CONTRATO 2-85 Y OTRos CONTRATOS, BASIC RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL
(BAHAMAS) LIMITED (1996) (on file with authors).
111 Letter from Peter A. Seligmann, Chairman and CEO, Conservation Int'l, to Mr. Rodolfo
Sosa De Le6n, President, Basic Resources Int'l (Bahamas) Ltd., and M.A.K. Alizai, Director,
Oil, Gas & Mining Dep't, International Finance Corp. (July 3, 1996) (on file with authors).
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final draft; and that IFC incorporate the fmal EMP into the loan agree-
ment, conduct semi-annual supervision missions, and work with the Com-
pany to ensure compliance. 112 The IFC board approved the loan on July
18.11 The final EMP, which was incorporated into the loan agreement by
reference, included the provision of $130,000 per year by the Company for
conservation activities to be undertaken by the government and an agree-
ment to conduct semiannual project supervision missions. 114
V. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES RAISED BY THE CASE STUDY
A. Enforcement of World Bank Policies Governing Forestry and
Critical Habitats
The first loan to the Company financed a new right-of-way within, and
a new point of entry for colonists into, Laguna del Tigre National Park, as
well as a new road for some eighty kilometers within the adjoining buffer
zone of the Maya Biosphere Reserve (MBR) on its trajectory to the refm-
ery at La Libertad. In addition to the habitat degradation directly brought
about by construction of the pipeline and associated service road, the
pipeline project may have substantial indirect environmental impacts. Re-
cent estimates by World Bank ecologist George Ledec suggest that for
every kilometer of new road built through tropical forest, roughly 400 to
2400 hectares are deforested and colonized." 5 In the MBR, a region under
great pressure from colonization, an influx of colonists and expansion of
slash and burn agriculture has already occurred along the road into
Laguna del Tigre National Park." 6 Most of this deforestation has occurred
since 1993, and indications are that the same may occur along the pipeline
right-of-way if appropriate mitigation is not conducted." 7 Recognizing
that responsibility for mitigation in this instance would be shared by gov-
ernment agencies, other concerned entities, and stakeholders like the
Company, IFC has a responsibility to ensure that projects meet World
Bank environmental standards. In this case, the minimum appropriate mit-
igation measure would have been for the pipeline to follow the path of the
existing road between the Xan oil field and La Libertad. In our view, the
World Bank Wildlands Policy should have made such a measure a condi-
tion for IFC financing.
B. Public Consultation Practices
The case at hand shows evidence of shortcomings in the IFC policies
and practices for public consultation regarding environmental assess-
112 Id.
113 Letter from M.A.K. Alizai, Director, Oil, Gas & Mining Dep't, International Finance
Corp., to Peter Seligmann, Chairman of the Board and CEO, Conservation Int'l (Aug. 6, 1996)
(on file with authors).
114 Id.
115 GEORGE LEDEC, MINIMIZING ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS FROM PETROLEUM EXPLORATION
AND DEVELOPMENT IN TROPICAL FOREST AREAS 2 (1990).
116 SADER, supra note 5, at 15.
117 Id.
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ments. The Company's first loan in 1994 included two components. Fi-
nancing the construction of the pipeline from Xan to La Libertad was
classified as a Category A loan, while the expansion of production and
upgrading of the refinery were classified as Category B.118 CI and its local
counterparts in the MBR are important stakeholders for land-use deci-
sions in the Laguna del Tigre National Park. Nonetheless, CI and other
stakeholders did not become aware of the first IFC loan until after it was
approved and construction of the pipeline was about to commence. This
represents a failure in the consultation process.
The Company's second loan also included two components, the ex-
pansion of the Xan oil field and the increase in production to 20,000 bpd,
both of which were classified as Category A loans." 9 Although the spon-
sor, in this case the Company, consulted with certain local parties and
made its draft environmental assessment available at its local offices, very
few organizations had the opportunity to comment on it before it was sub-
mitted to the World Bank's Public Information Center (PIC). 120 Even after
the EA was submitted for public comment at the PIC in Washington, it was
difficult to get a copy of the document in Guatemala. Because the practice
of widespread public comment and review is still under development in
Guatemala and many other countries where IFC has clients, a longer and.
more proactive review process-including the provision of documents in
country-is necessary to ensure effective public consultation.
Finally, there are important questions about the timing and integrity
of the public consultations, on the part of IFC, over environmental man-
agement practices in the second loan. In the period immediately prior to
IFC board approval of the second loan, stakeholders were engaged in a
detailed discussion of practices to be used for the expansion of oil produc-
tion.' 2 ' During the course of these discussions, CI learned from the news
media that the expansion of oil production and construction of the pipe-
line extension had already begun. 122 This development brings into ques-
tion the validity of IFC's consultation process. Both of these events
occurred while the EA was still in process. It is essential that project activ-
118 Grandia, supra note 17, at 29.
119 CONTRATO 1-85, supra note 95, at 4.
120 Summary of Memo, supra note 96.
121 Propuesta. Plan de Emergencia, segundo semestre 1996, y Plan Operativo, a Afo 1997
(May 31, 1996) (document by a consortium of Guatemalan organizations including CECON,
Municipality of San Andres, Institute of Anthropology and History (IDEAH), CONAMA, TNC,
and CI) (on file with authors).
122 In mid-June 1996, Guatemala's Director of Hydrocarbons, Francisco Arevalo, said "In
January the total production was approximately 12,000 barrels a day but the perforation of
two new wells has raised production to almost 20,000 barrels a day." Ortiz, supra note 18.
The same article stated further that
Basic Petroleum International Ltd .... , Guatemala's only oil producer, brought on
line in recent months wells Xan 10 and Xan 11 in northern Petdn. Each produces over
2,000 barrels a day.... By August Basic plans to complete construction of a pipeline
connecting its Xan oilfields and La Libertad refinery with an existing pipeline to a port
on the Caribbean.
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ities not begin until an EA has been concluded and approved. We note that
this set of issues represents a point of factual disagreement with IFC,
which maintains that the planned expansion to be funded by the second
loan had not already taken place during these discussions with CI.123
C. Comment Period for Environmental Assessments
The effective public comment period on the EA, and the EMP in the
case of the second loan, was narrowed to a very short period of time.
124
The sixty-day comment period for the second IFC loan closed just one
business day before consideration of the loan by the IFC board of direc-
tors.125 The EA document, because of poor distribution, effectively did not
become available in Guatemala until early May. Important supporting doc-
uments, including a cumulative impacts study and a preliminary biodivers-
ity assessment, arrived even later. The local stakeholder consultation
process was chaotic and rushed. Finally, CI was asked by IFC staff to
accommodate a print deadline for compilation of materials for board re-
view and to submit comments prior to the close of the comment period. 12
6
It is questionable to what degree meaningful input could be provided un-
less a full comment period was observed. It is also unlikely that comments
submitted to IFC by third parties could have been assimilated by IFC of-
ficers after the close of the comment period and prior to board considera-
tion unless a time period was set aside specifically for this purpose. The
large number of stakeholders, the complex and volatile social and political
context, and the confusing and contradictory regulatory framework de-
manded a longer review period. The frantic pace of the short review pe-
riod did not allow for adequate public consultation given the factors
mentioned.
D. Public Access to Loan Documents
The commercial nature of IFC's loans justifies keeping certain infor-
mation out of the public domain. However, documents on environmental
and social impacts should be considered public information. In the case of
the second loan, CI understood that the environmental loan conditions
would be made public. This, however, did not occur and it remains un-
clear what environmental commitments the Company has made to IFC
and whether and how it will report on the satisfaction of those commit-
ments because those reports will also be protected from disclosure. We
note that this is also an area of factual disagreement with IFC. CI inter-
preted IFC statements to mean that, while the EMP was already a public
document as part of the broader EA, the public would also have access to
the portion of the investment agreement that dealt specifically with legal
provisions surrounding compliance with environmental conditions. IFC
123 International Finance Corp., Comments on CI's draft Report (Dec. 15, 1996) (IFC
memorandum to CI) (on file with authors).
124 Memo to Mittermeier, supra note 98; Mahajan Interview, supra note 99.
125 Memo to Mittermeier, supra note 98.
126 Mahajan Interview, supra note 99.
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disagrees with this interpretation and considers the EMP itself to consti-
tute the environmental loan conditions that would be disclosed to the pub-
lic because the EMP is incorporated into the loan document by
reference. 127
IFC made one supervisory mission to Guatemala in January 19 9 7 .128
CI staff met with IFC before the mission to detail their concerns and ques-
tions about the Company's operation. CI received an oral summary of the
mission findings. However, a written summary has not been made avail-
able to the public.
IFC also declined to provide a variety of other documents that CI re-
quested during the course of the negotiations. 129 For example, it would
not provide its own internal review of the Company's EA.13 0 Both IFC and
the Company also refused to provide an environmental audit that the
Company had apparently submitted in the context of an earlier loan, even
though IFC and the Company both claimed the audit revealed a "clean
operation." 3 1
E. Limited Public Benefits
IFC officers repeatedly echoed the position that IFC did not have any
responsibility to address public sector issues and that IFC did not need to
concern itself about the secondary impacts of its loan.132 The rationale for
this position was that the loan was to the private sector and that the gov-
ernment had already approved the project.'3 3 However, IFC is funded with
public money and its projects should not exist to the detriment of the
public good. In this case, IFC's lending did little to increase the capacity of
public agencies in the context of a sustainable development strategy.
Rather, the process worked against this goal. Although public institution
capacity building is not IFC's responsibility, IFC should have recognized
that the environmental regulatory mechanisms in Guatemala are relatively
new and that the government is still in the process of establishing the
institutional capacity to enforce and implement its regulations. Faced with
this situation, IFC officers should have recommended that the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or other devel-
opment agencies work to help increase this capacity before moving ahead
with its own project.
127 International Finance Corp., supra note 123.
128 Memorandum from Conrad Reining to Ron Anderson, Deema Fakoury, and Harvey
Van Veldhuiza, IFC Mission to Guatemala, January/February 1997 (Jan. 23, 1997) (internal
Conservation Int'l memorandum) (on file with authors).
129 Meetings Between International Finance Corp. and Conservation Int'l (May-July 1996)
[hereinafter IFC-CI Meetings].
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
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F. Environmental Staffing Capacity at IFC
Providing environmental clearance of IFC loans appears to have al-
ready stretched IFC capacity beyond its limit. In the case of both loans,
the EAs provided by the Company were written in Spanish, with an execu-
tive summary translated into English. 13 4 The desk officer responsible for
reviewing the document admitted he did not understand Spanish, at least
at the level of fluency necessary to read and evaluate a study of the envi-
ronmental impacts of a petroleum well field and pipeline expansion.'
3 5
Although the environmental officer was knowledgeable in many of
the issues presented by the EA, it was clear that the officer did not pos-
sess the level of sophistication in the technical aspects of the operations
that the EA considered and would be relying on CI to provide technical
assistance. Indeed, CI relied on assistance from experienced petroleum
geologists to supplement its own developing capacity to review oil produc-
tion and exploration activities. Beyond the obvious problems created by
the language barrier, the environmental desk officer responsible for re-
viewing the EA indicated he maintains an active portfolio of hundreds of
investment projects throughout the world, many of them an order of mag-
nitude greater in size and scope than the EA.136 During the course of the
negotiations, it soon became apparent that IFC did not have the capacity
to conduct meaningful environmental review of the Company's loan re-
quest, and many important technical issues raised would probably not
have been adequately addressed if CI had not raised them.
G. Prepayment
IFC frequently justifies loans for environmentally and socially sensi-
tive projects by stating that its procedural safeguards as well as its stand-
ing as a multilateral institution allow it to exert control over companies
that would otherwise obtain funding free of any environmental or social
constraints and contingencies. This claim has a measure of legitimacy-in
this case, the Company was ultimately required to do more for the envi-
ronment than it would have because of IFC and, of course, NGO pressure.
However, as the issues raised above indicate, IFC's impact was far more
limited than it should have been. Perhaps more significantly, the claim
that IFC's presence ensures minimum standards is undermined by the fact
that in this case-and at least one other prominent case where environ-
mental considerations drew public criticism' 3 7-the project sponsors
chose to prepay the loan rather than continue to work with IFC. If in fact
most sponsors prefer to prepay loans rather than respond to calls by IFC,
the public, and NGOs for more safeguards, the argument highlighting the
utility of IFC's role in protecting the environment becomes highly suspect.
134 CONTRATO 1-85, supra note 95.
135 IFC-CI Meetings, supra note 129.
136 id.
137 HAIR ET AL., supra note 48.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IFC REFORM
It is our conclusion that this example lays out a compelling case for
institutional reform of IFC. The loans in question concern major natural
resource extraction activities in an internationally known national park. A
simple reading of the World Bank's own policies on forestry and critical
habitats should have prevented the first loan from proceeding as formu-
lated. The second loan saw important progress, but the final results re-
main mixed, particularly in the light of the Company's recent decision to
prepay its loans to IFC. The following recommendations for reform grow
out of this case study. In general, it is apparent that greater transparency
is needed in the investment decision-making process, consistent with legit-
imate respect for proprietary information.
Recommendation One: IFC should strictly enforce World Bank poli-
cies governing forestry and natural habitats, particularly in the case of
infrastructure and major resource extraction projects. It is clear that the
first loan violated the spirit of the World Bank's Wildlands, Natural Habi-
tats, and Forestry policies, as well as several international environmental
treaties. Adopting a new and more strictly constructed operational policy
will aid IFC in avoiding future investments in projects that will have a
substantial negative impact on natural habitats, particularly national
parks. These policies are particularly important to infrastructure and re-
source extraction projects and provision could be made, for example, to
accept or exempt small-scale sustainable community enterprise develop-
ment projects from these requirements.
Recommendation Two: IFC should design stronger mechanisms to
ensure that its public consultation process is more proactive and open.
Provisions should be made for ensuring there is adequate distribution of
environmental review documents and procedures for public participation
in the country and in the area affected by the investment-regardless of
whether it is required by local law. IFC should also restructure its public
comment period for environmental assessments to reflect more realistic
timeframes for review of complex, technical documents. The public com-
ment period should be on the order of 120 days for Category A projects.
Additionally, there should be a sufficient buffer between the end of the
comment period and the planned date for IFC board review of the pro-
posed loan to allow for full assimilation of comments by IFC officers.
Recommendation Three: IFC should increase public access to certain
loan documents in order to facilitate outside participation in both pro-
ject appraisal and postapproval oversight of loan performance. In the ab-
sence of compelling reasons to the contrary, environmental loan
conditions, IFC environmental review documents, and staff reports should
be public information, and they should be published in the relevant lan-
guages. It is impossible for the public to cooperate with IFC to provide
input on projects unless these documents are publicly available with suffi-
cient time for thorough review.
Recommendation Four: IFC should increase its level of coordination
with the rest of the World Bank Group and other development agencies.
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IFC investments should be consistent with national strategies for sustaina-
ble development. The private sector partners of IFC are regulated by pub-
lic institutions that often lack capacity and experience in the regulatory
process. Greater coordination with the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association
(IDA), as well as other development agencies, would help ensure that IFC
lending does not undermine the effectiveness of public institutions. Lend-
ing programs should also promote greater coordination in capacity build-
ing between the public and private sectors. This recommendation is
particularly important when dealing with public land and natural
resources.
Recommendation Five: IFC should recruit additional qualified envi-
ronmental staff. In order to meet the requirements of its own policies, IFC
needs to hire additional environmental staff with the necessary technical
expertise and language skills to review the sort of technical information
presented in this case study.
Recommendation Six: IFC should anticipate the prepayment contin-
gency in the loan agreement. This case study and the Pangue experience
indicate that IFC can be removed quickly and completely from participa-
tion in and oversight of a project by a sponsor's decision to prepay its
loan. IFC should ensure that prepayment will not have this effect by antici-
pating this contingency in the loan agreement. For example, the loan
agreement could state that the loan is contingent upon the sponsor's com-
mitment to continuing environmental assessment procedures, maintaining
insurance coverage, continuing to make a performance bond available,
and other similar measures agreed to with IFC, in addition to requirements
under domestic law. The loan agreement should also impose penalties for
the sponsor's failure to comply with these requirements.
VII. EPILOGUE
We prepared this Article in the second half of 1997 and early 1998.
Subsequent to the events described in this study, IFC undertook a review
of its environmental and social policies and procedures. The review pro-
cess yielded draft policies, which were presented for consideration at an
informal IFC board of directors seminar in early 1998 and then released
for public comment.'1 s The board of directors later approved the draft
policies in principle, although official notice of approval is pending as of
this writing. 139 The stated reason for delay is to ensure that the new poli-
cies will be consistent with the adoption of new internal administrative
procedures 140 and also to ensure that the new policies will be consistent
with minor revisions of World Bank policies.14 ' However, despite these
138 IFC's ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICIES AND PROCEDURES AND PoLIcY ON DISCLOSURE
OF INFORMATION 1 (1998) [hereinafter IFC's ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICIES].
139 Telephone Interview by Cyril Kormos with Mark Constantine, Manager, Corporate Re-
lations, IFC (Oct. 20, 1998) [hereinafter Constantine Interview].
140 Id.
141 IFC's ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POLICIES, supra note 138, at 2.
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delays, IFC staff reportedly have considered the new policies operational
as of September 1998.142
The new policies will perform a number of useful functions, such as
harmonizing IFC and IBRD project requirements and strengthening infor-
mation disclosure and public consultation procedures. 143 For example,
IFC has now drafted a "good practices" manual for its clients and will
extend its environmental review procedures to projects in which it acts
only as a financial intermediary. 14 IFC will also add to its public consulta-
tion requirements for Category A projects such that consultation will con-
tinue throughout parts of project implementation. 145 For Category A
projects in which an EA was prepared prior to IFC involvement, IFC will
now add the requirement that the client draw up a Public Consultation and
Disclosure Plan to ensure adequate public participation in project devel-
opment and review. 146 In addition, the new draft policies and procedures
will no longer allow the board to waive disclosure requirements for Cate-
gory A projects. 147 IFC now also commits to increase its own institutional
capacity for consultation, community relations, information disclosure,
and other key functions in the environmental review process. 148 Finally,
the draft policies and procedures will also strengthen Category B Environ-
mental Review Summaries and ensure their release thirty days before
Board consideration. 149
From our perspective, even more encouraging is the that fact IFC
clearly considered NGO comments in formulating its new policies.
Although in many cases IFC did not make additional modifications to the
draft policies based on outside comments, IFC did strengthen certain re-
quirements for information disclosure. Specifically, IFC will now translate
and release both the Category B Environmental Review Summary and the
results of "required consultations in-country in a culturally appropriate
manner." 50 IFC also committed to releasing examples of standard envi-
ronmental and social covenants frequently used in loan agreements and to
create an archive of SPIs, ERSs, and EA reports so that these documents
will be available after the current one-year posting.' 5 '
Despite these positive developments, however, challenges remain.
The criteria used to classify projects are still imprecise; therefore, the risk
continues that environmentally sensitive projects could be classified as
Category B and subjected to a lower level of scrutiny. 52 In addition, dis-
closure of environmental impact assessments for Category A projects will
142 Constantine Interview, supra note 139.
143 IFC's ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL POUCIES, supra note 138, at 6-7, 20-21, 23-24.
144 Id. attachment 2, at 12.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. attachment 2, at 12-13.
148 Id. attachment 2, at 1-17.
149 Id. attachment 2, at 13-14.
150 Id. attachment 2, at 26.
151 Id.
152 Id. attachment 2, annex B, at 20.
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continue to be required only 60 days prior to board consideration of a
project, rather than the 120-day period required by IBRD.' 53 Environmen-
tal covenants in loan agreements will also remain confidential, as will
monthly operations reports. 5 4 Finally, portions of the language in the
draft policies and procedures remain vague, discretionary, hortatory, or
subject to interpretation by decision makers. Thus, there continue to be
several areas in which significant improvements can still be made. In addi-
tion, given the fact that IFC took several years to review policies and pro-
cedures after NGOs began to make suggestions to strengthen them,155
there is good reason to await full implementation of the draft policies and
procedures before declaring that IFC has engineered lasting change in
monitoring the environmental impacts of its lending.
153 Id. attachment 2, at 12-13.
154 Id. attachment 2, at 25-26
155 Id. attachment 2, at 1.
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APPENDIX A
Cl's comments to the environmental management plan (EMP) of Ba-
sic Resources International (Company) were grouped around eight princi-
ples, which were based on the World Bank's Operational Policies for
Natural Habitats. 156
Principle #1:
Access routes into the Laguna del Tigre National Park (Park) "that
result from the past, present, and future activities of the Company, includ-
ing roads, pipelines, rivers, and seismic" lines, will "be adequately con-
trolled to discourage spontaneous colonization, illegal hunting of wildlife,
looting of archaeological sites and other illegal activities associated with
uncontrolled access to the Park."157 The EMP should include an access
control plan.
Principle #2:
Company activities within the Park, or Company activities that may
affect the Park, will "conform to the highest appropriate design stan-
dards[, ... employ best management practices, and best available tech-
nologies for petroleum operations in environmentally sensitive areas,
especially in tropical wetlands that represent critical natural habitats as
defined by World Bank Operational Policies." 158
Principle #3:
"Activities within the Park[,I by employees or in support of employ-
ees[,] other than those directly related to the essential operations of the
Company[, will] ... be carefully controlled and confined to the contract
area."159
Principle #4:
In addition to assuming environmental management responsibility in its con-
tract area, the Company will participate with other interested parties in an ap-
propriate financial mechanism designed to support the management
requirements of the Park in a manner commensurate with the Company's re-
sponsibilities for operating within a National Park and critical natural
habitat. 160
The Company will also collaborate and cooperate with other parties, such
as the Guatemalan National Council for Protected Areas (CONAP), the
Center for Conservation Studies at the University of San Carlos (CECON),
the National Commission on the Environment (CONAMA), Municipality of
156 Mittermeier Letter, supra note 101, at 3-9.
157 Id. at 3.
158 Id. at 4.
159 Id. at 6.
160 Id.
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San Andr~s, Institute of Anthropology and History (IDAEH), and Ministry
of Energy and Mines (MEM), in the administration and protection of the
Park. Administrative structures to achieve this collaboration will be devel-
oped in the context of the proposed Operational Plan and included in the
EMP.
Principle #5:
The Company will provide "[a]ppropriate conservation, mitigation[,]
and restoration measures to remove or reduce adverse impacts on natural
habitats or their function[s] within the ... Park that result from the opera-
tions of the Company.' 61
Principle #6:
The EMP will include
[an appropriate environmental monitoring and evaluation plan in conform-
ance with generally accepted criteria for monitoring the effects of petroleum
operations in sensitive areas[,] ... to provide feedback on conservation out-
comes and to provide guidance for developing or refining appropriate actions,
including.., provisions for independent monitoring and access to the contract
area for periodic inspection.162
Principle #7:
"An appropriate agreement ... to implement the EMP and monitor its
compliance... [will] be developed with the governmental entity or other
entities[,]" as established pursuant to the laws of Guatemala, with manage-
ment responsibilities in the Park. 163
Principle #8:
"The EMP [will] . . . be enforceable under Guatemalan law and as a
condition of the loan agreement with ... IFC."164
161 Id.
162 Id. at 7.
163 Id. at 8.
164 Id. at 9.
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APPENDIX B
CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIONS
1985:
1990:
1992:
1993:
May 1994:
November 1994:
May 1995:
July 1995:
July 21, 1995:
Late 1995:
January 1996:
April 15, 1996:
May 31, 1996:
June 4, 1996:
June 7, 1996:
June 12, 1996:
June 15, 1996:
June 18, 1996:
June 21, 1996:
June 24, 1996:
July 18, 1996:
The Company is awarded development rights to the Xan oil
concession in northwest Guatemala.
The government of Guatemala creates the Maya Biosphere
Reserve.
The Company is awarded a larger oil concession completely
surrounding the original Xan oil field, within Laguna del Tigre
National Park.
The Company first applies for funding from IFC.
IFC approves the first loan to the Company, totaling $20 million.
CI and IFC first meet to discuss the implications of this loan.
Discussions include siting of the pipeline between the Xan field
and the La Libertad refinery.
CI and local partners submit a proposed mitigation plan to offset
the effects' of the new pipeline.
The Company rejects the mitigation plan.
The Company inaugurates its new pipeline, built with IFC funds.
CI learns that the Company has applied for a second loan from
IFC.
CI sends IFC a detailed analysis of the current situation and a
renewed call for mitigation.
The Company submits its environmental assessment for public
comment to the World Bank's Public Information Center.
CI submits comments to IFC and requests postponement of the
board date.
IFC agrees that environmental clearance will not be given until
there is an agreement between CI and the Company over an
acceptable EMP.
IFC moves the scheduled board date back to June 27.
CI writes to World Bank President James Wolfensohn requesting
postponement of the board date.
The public comment period closes.
IFC's board of directors is originally scheduled to consider the
loan.
CI, the Company, and IFC meet in Guatemala City to discuss the
EMP.
The Company submits a revised EMP.
The loan is presented to the IFC board and approved.
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